I tweeted over the weekend something along the lines of how LBJ wouldn’t have been as successful in 2012 as he was in 1963 and 1964. And, after finishing Robert Caro’s The Passage of Power, I will stand by that remark.
It’s a great book, I highly recommend it. That said, I found it slightly more scattershot than the previous two volumes. The ostensible theme of the volume is supposed to be LBJ’s three years as Vice President and first few months in office as President. I think the years as Vice President largely get swept up in a few chapters because, as even the casual reader might suspect, no Vice President ever does a heck of a lot of note. There’s a lot in the book about LBJ’s too-little, too-late run at the Presidency in 1960. In essence, he thought his status of Majority Leader and most powerful Democrat in the U.S. at the time would equate to power at the convention. It didn’t as he was out-maneuvered by the Kennedy campaign. Which isn’t a surprise, Kennedy had been actually running for President for months before the campaign and had convinced delegates both that they would win and that they would remember who wasn’t with them when they did win. For some reason, LBJ thought the force of his personality would overcome these commitments and the fear of breaking them. In retrospect, it seems pretty irrational.
As I said, the book skips from the interesting 1959 and 1960 events to 1963 with only brief focus on the VP years. If you read the excerpt of the book in a recent New Yorker piece, you’ll see the flavor of the coverage of November 22, 1963 and the events in Dallas. What seemed new to me was the idea that the Bobby Baker scandal was percolating that exact week. With the implication being that had JFK lived, that scandal may have blossomed to the point of endangering LBJ’s slot on the national ticket. As with all alternative histories, we’ll never know. Caro, however, makes the case that LBJ may not have been able to swing Texas for JFK as he did in 1960. Nor was he as popular in the South after deciding to leave his post in the Senate to become Vice President. We’ll never know.
The meat of the months after November 22, 1963 consists of the description of two huge legislative initiatives pushed by Johnson: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the so-called Kennedy tax cut (the one we still hear about occasionally from Republicans running for office). Caro makes a case that LBJ got those bills through a Congress when JFK could not have. First, Caro argues (with evidence) that LBJ understood what Kennedy and his congressional liaisons (up to and including Larry O’Brien apparently) did not: that the Civil Rights bill had to be the last big initiative of that Congress. Otherwise, its opponents would use every other important bill sought to be passed by the Administration as leverage in order to kill it. The tax cut bill being the most obvious such hostage. Second, Caro argues (somewhat less convincingly) that only LBJ would have understood that the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee Harry Byrd (D-VA) meant what he said when he said that no tax bill would pass through his committee unless the 1965 Budget came in at less than $100 billion (with the initial projected budget by Kennedy and his staff looking like it was going to be $105 billion or more). Caro spends a couple of chapters describing the Presidential butt-kissing (and I’m not exaggerating here) by Johnson of Byrd to get his tax cut bill.
Both of these initiatives were passed by a Senate in which the Democrats held a clear majority: 67 Democrats to 33 Republicans! But, remember, the filibuster rule (Senate Rule 22) required 67 Senators to break a filibuster. Still, as Caro described, Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans had formed an alliance which looks, philosophically, not that much different from the current Senate today. The Southern Democrats of 1963 have been transformed into Southern Republicans. However, the difference today is that the Republicans, especially more liberal Republicans (Maine Senators, I’m looking at you) feel a lot less free to buck their caucus than would have been the case for a Senator in either party in 1964. Thus my point on Twitter that even LBJ at the height of his power would not have been able to isolate, say Olympia Snowe, from her larger GOP caucus. There just wouldn’t be enough cover for her.
Caro also argues that the Senate prior to the arrival of Johnson as the Majority Leader and later President sounds an awful lot like the Senate of today. Not a heck of a lot got done. So, could a modern President take some lessons about the power of personal politics from this book? Sure, a few. But, all in all, it’s simply fascinating historical reading about a short time during which the Senate actually worked.
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